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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SUSAN H. EARLY,
CASE NO. 890306-CA
Respondent/Plaintiff
v.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

DAVID W. EARLY,
Appellant/Defendant
)

The appellant, David W. Early, herewith replies to the
brief of the respondent as follows:
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
ERRORS AS TO THE TAX DEBT ON THE REAL PROPERTY
In respondent's brief on this issue, she first argues that
"taxes were accruing on the residence each day that this lawsuit
was pending.

In fact, the taxes were a lien upon the resident

as of January 1, 1988." (Respondent's brief, p. 8)

While it is

true that taxes become a lien upon the property as of January 1st
of each year, it is not true that taxes accrue each day.
The mere fact that a lien is created does not mean that the
taxes are accruing.

All a lien does is give the taxing entity

a right to resort to the property for the payment of the taxes
due

if the owner does not voluntarily pay same. Anson v.

Ellison, 140 P2d. 653 (Utah, 1943)
in Utah.

This has long been the law

The existence of a lien on the property is conditional

and subject to various limitations.

Anson v. Ellison, supra., at
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p. 656.

It is well settled in this state that "until levy and

assessment are made, there is no tax lien on realty;

but when made,

the tax relates back to the owner as of noon, January 1st of
the taxable year."

Huntington City v. Peterson, 518 P2d 1246,

at 1248 (Utah, 1974)
It is certainly clear, then, that no tax was accruing on a
daily basis upon the property.

The assessments are not mailed

out to the property owners until July (59-2-919, U.C.A.), and the
final tax bills are not mailed until shortly before the November
1st deadline. (59-2-1317, U.C.A.)

As a practical matter, all

tax bills to property owners in Utah are mailed during the month
of October.

Salt Lake County doesn't start mailing their bills

until the second week in October, as all property owners in the
county are well aware.

Thus, the Earlys

may not have even received

their tax notice until after the Decree of Divorce was entered.
Since there was no monthly impound for taxes by a mortgage company
or other lender, and since the tax bill was not received by the
parties until October, Mr. Early cannot be expected to pay for
a non-existent debt.
This is the due date.

The debt was not due until November 30th.
While the tax fee may have been paid

earlier, after the tax notice was mailed and received, if we are
to fix a "due date" it would have to be November 30th.
The respondent finally argues that the district court was
in the best position to rule on its intent in the order.
really isn't true.

This

The provision dealing with the taxes was part

of Commissioner Peuler's recommendation (R.318), and while the
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respondent did object to some points of the recommendation (R.321),
she did not object to this portion of the recommendation.

Thus,

Judge Moffat in his subsequent Order (R.398) never even
considered this issue.

He would therefore be in no position

to interpret the point in issue as being one of his own making.
While we may debate due dates, and other such matters,
it would seem that the real issue to be decided is the intent
of the court.

It would seem clear that the intent of the

court was to provide for the payment of certain debts as they
may have accrued during the pendency of the proceedings.

That is,

to divide the actual payment of debts during the action to protect
one party or the other.

Certainly the court was under the

impression that the monthly house payments included an impound
for taxes and insurance.

But this was not the case.

While a

debt did exist against the property no monthly impound for taxes
and insurance existed.

Thus, no tax debt accrued and became

due until the tax notices were sent to the parties.

We submit

that that debt did not then become due until November 30th, well
after the entry of the Decree.

Accordingly, it is the respondent's

responsibility to pay for the tax debt.

She was the one who

occupied the premises, and it was to her that the property was
ultimately awarded.

-4-

POINT II:
ERRORS AS TO MRS. EARLY'S DEBTS PAID BY MR. EARLY
We have argued that the district court committed error
by refusing to grant Mr. Early a judgment against Mrs. Early
for debts of hers paid by him which she had been ordered to pay
by the court.

The respondent's brief cites the general language

of the Mutual Release (R.802) to support her position that she
is released from paying Mr. Early back for the monies he paid
towards her bills.

This would be true if the release were a

complete release as it appears to be initially.

However, the

court will note that the release provides as follows?
"It is the intention of the parties that hence forth
there shall be as betv/een them only such explicit
rights and obligations as are specifically provided
in the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement
hereinabove identified and the judgment which issues
pursuant thereto." R.805) [Emphasis added]
Respondent's brief argues that " . . . the Release
specifically preserved Mrs. Early's rights under the Property
Settlement Agreement and Decree of Divorce, which in turn both
specifically required Mr. Early to pay all debts he had been
previously ordered to pay.

Mr. Early never bargained for or

received any such reservation of rights." (Respondent's brief, p.
10)

Wrong.

It is clear from the language quoted above that

any rights reserved under the Stipulation and Decree were mutually
reserved#

We see no language that limits this reservation to Mrs.

Early alone.
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Since this provision provides that the parties retain
the rights set forth in the Decree, what does the Decree say
on this matter?

Paragraph 13 of the Decree (R.782) provides

that:
"The Plaintiff shall assume and pay the separate
debts and obligations which she has incurred subsequent
to the separation of the parties, excepting those which,
by previous order of the Court, Defendant is obligated
to pay, and shall indemnify and hold Defendant harmless
therefrom."
This provision is identical to paragraph 12 of the Stipulation.
Mrs. Early is the plaintiff.

The above provision in the Decree

orders her to "assume and pay" the debts she incurred subsequent
to the date of separation, excepting certain debts Mr. Early had
been ordered to pay.

There is no dispute that the debts for

which Mr. Early seeks reimbursement were incurred subsequent to
the date of separation.

Certainly Mrs. Early's incorrect reading

of the Release attempts to portray it as being unilateral in
nature as to the reservation of rights.

It is not unilateral.

It is mutual.
The reservation of rights being mutual the Decree of Divorce
governs and that Decree specifically, and clearly, provides and
requires that Mrs. Early pay for the debts for which Mr. Early
seeks reimbursement.

If the Release is as sweeping as Mrs. Early

claims, then certainly she has no right making a claim against
Mr. Earlv for taxes.

Without question, then, Mrs. Early owes Mr.

Early the amount claimed, and the court was in error in refusing
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to enter judgment accordingly.
POINT III:
THE COURT VIOLATED RULE 52(a)
Respondent argues that the court was not required to issue
a basis for its opinion because she didn't bring her motion under
any of the cited rules.

The problem with this is that the

Respondent doesn't cite any rule in her motion under which the
motion is made. (R.875)

Nor does she cite a rule in her brief.

The only plausible position one could take in this regard is
that the motion was a motion for summary judgment, falling under
Rule 56.

And as to the argument that Rule 52 limits the

requirement to situations where the motion is made upon more than
one ground, this applies only to motions made under Rule 59—not
the other rules.
We therefore submit that the court erroneously failed to
issue a brief written statement and justify the basis for its
ruling.
CONCLUSION
Concerning the tax debt, we submit that it was the court's
intention to protect Mrs. Early from the monthly house payments
during the pendency of the action.

Not to protect her from tax

debts on the property that were due after the entry of the Decree.
There having been no monthly impound for taxes and insurance during
the pendency of the action, Mr. Early's only obligation was the
payment of the overall mortgage covering various pieces of property,
including the family home.

This he did.

The tax notices would
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not have been mailed until October, and Mr. Early was not aware
of the debt until demand was made upon him well after the entry
of the Decree in October.

That tax debt was not delinquent until

after November 30th7 subsequent to the entry of the court's Decree.
As to the debts of Mrs. Early that were paid by Mr. Early,
the Mutual Release is not unilateral in reserving to Mrs. Early
obligations under the Divorce Decree.

Both parties reserved the

right to have the other party responsible for such matters as
were ordered in the Decree.

That Decree specifically provides

that Mrs. Early is to pay for debts incurred by her after the
date of separation.
As to the failure of the court to justify its ruling by
a written statement of some sort, Rule 52 clearly provides that
the court make and enter a written statement setting forth the
basis for its ruling.

The plaintiff's motion was in all respects

a motion for Nummary judgment, and therefore falls under the
purvue of Rule 52.
Respectfully submitted,

BRANT H. WALL
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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